🕑 Estimated reading time: 4 minutes | Last updated: November 5, 2024
A software supply chain attack compromises a trusted vendor, tool, update or open-source component to reach that supplier’s customers. Notable examples include the SolarWinds Orion compromise discovered in 2020, the Kaseya VSA ransomware attack in 2021, the mass exploitation of MOVEit Transfer in 2023 and the XZ Utils backdoor discovered in March 2024. Defences include vendor risk management, software bills of materials, least privilege for third-party tools, rapid patching, monitoring of trusted software behaviour and secure development practices.

You can lock every door in your own house and still be burgled through a neighbour’s attic. In software, that neighbour is the vendor or library you trust, and attackers have learned that compromising one supplier can unlock thousands of victims.
Organisations spend heavily on protecting their own networks, but every one of them depends on software and services built by others: operating systems, accounting packages, file transfer tools, IT management platforms and thousands of open-source libraries. A supply chain attack targets these trusted links. By compromising one supplier, an attacker can gain access to hundreds or thousands of downstream victims at once, often through software updates that customers install willingly.
Table of Contents
How Supply Chain Attacks Work
Common approaches include:
- Compromising a vendor’s build or update system so legitimate updates carry malicious code signed with the vendor’s own certificate.
- Exploiting vulnerabilities in widely used products, especially internet-facing ones, to hit many customers simultaneously.
- Poisoning open-source packages, by taking over maintainers’ accounts, publishing look-alike packages (“typosquatting”), or slowly gaining a maintainer’s trust.
- Abusing managed service providers and remote management tools that have privileged access to many clients.
- Hardware tampering, though this is far less common.
Major Case Studies
SolarWinds (discovered December 2020)
Attackers, attributed by the US and UK governments to Russia’s foreign intelligence service, inserted a backdoor known as SUNBURST into updates of SolarWinds’ Orion IT monitoring software. Around 18,000 customers installed the compromised updates, and the attackers then selectively pursued high-value targets, including US government agencies and technology companies. The breach went undetected for months and transformed how governments think about software security.
Kaseya VSA (July 2021)
The REvil ransomware group exploited vulnerabilities in Kaseya’s VSA remote management software, used by managed service providers. Through those providers, ransomware reached somewhere between 800 and 1,500 downstream businesses, including a Swedish supermarket chain that had to close hundreds of stores.
MOVEit Transfer (May 2023)
The Cl0p group exploited a previously unknown vulnerability in Progress Software’s MOVEit Transfer file-sharing product to steal data from organisations using it, before a patch was available. Because many of those organisations also processed data for others, such as payroll providers and pension administrators, the impact cascaded. Thousands of organisations and tens of millions of individuals were ultimately affected.
3CX (March 2023)
The desktop app of business phone provider 3CX was trojanised after one of its employees downloaded compromised software from another company, a rare “double” supply chain attack linked to North Korean actors.
XZ Utils (March 2024)
In March 2024, Microsoft engineer Andres Freund noticed unusual delays in SSH logins on a test Linux system and traced them to a backdoor hidden in versions 5.6.0 and 5.6.1 of XZ Utils, a compression library included in many Linux distributions. Investigation revealed that a contributor using the name “Jia Tan” had spent around two years building trust in the project before becoming a co-maintainer and inserting cleverly obfuscated malicious code. The backdoor was caught before reaching most stable distributions. The episode highlighted how much of the internet depends on volunteer maintainers and how sophisticated social engineering of open-source projects can be.
Why Supply Chain Attacks Are So Dangerous
- Scale: one compromise reaches many victims.
- Trust: malicious code arrives through legitimate, signed channels.
- Privilege: IT management and security tools often run with high privileges.
- Stealth: traffic from trusted software may not be scrutinised.
How Organisations Can Reduce the Risk
- Know your suppliers. Maintain an inventory of software and service providers, ranked by criticality and access.
- Assess vendor security before buying and periodically afterwards, focusing on secure development, incident response and update integrity.
- Limit third-party privileges. Grant vendor tools and service providers only the access they need, segment them, and require MFA for remote support.
- Patch internet-facing products urgently, especially file transfer, VPN and remote management tools, which are frequent targets.
- Monitor trusted software. Detection tools should alert on unusual behaviour even from signed applications, such as unexpected network connections.
- Request software bills of materials (SBOMs) to understand which components products contain, so you can respond quickly when a component vulnerability is announced.
- Plan for supplier incidents in your incident response and business continuity plans, including how to isolate a compromised tool.
- Write security into contracts, including breach notification timelines and audit rights.
How Software Developers Can Help
- Pin and verify dependencies and monitor them for known vulnerabilities.
- Protect build pipelines and signing keys as critical assets.
- Adopt frameworks such as SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) to strengthen build integrity.
- Require MFA for code repository and package registry accounts.
- Support the open-source projects you depend on, financially or through contributions.
Check what enters your software supply chain
Supply chain attacks exploit the trust that makes modern software ecosystems work. No organisation can eliminate this risk entirely, but by understanding its dependencies, limiting what trusted tools can do and preparing to respond quickly, it can make sure a supplier’s bad day does not become its own catastrophe.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is an SBOM?
A software bill of materials is an inventory of the components and libraries inside a piece of software.
Are open-source components riskier than commercial software?
Not necessarily. Open source can be scrutinised by many eyes, as the XZ Utils discovery showed, but projects with few maintainers can be vulnerable to takeover.
Can small businesses do anything about supply chain risk?
Yes: choose reputable vendors, keep software updated, use MFA on vendor accounts and limit remote access tools.