🕑 Estimated reading time: 4 minutes  |  Last updated: May 1, 2026

Scattered Spider is a loosely organised, largely English-speaking cybercrime group known for phoning IT help desks while impersonating employees, persuading staff to reset passwords or register new multi-factor authentication devices, then moving fast into cloud and identity systems, sometimes deploying ransomware. The attacks on Marks & Spencer and the Co-op in 2025 are widely attributed to it. Defences include strong caller verification, extra checks for privileged accounts, phishing-resistant MFA, alerts on MFA changes and limiting what outsourced help desks can do.

A man sitting in front of a computer monitor

Picture a busy Monday at an IT service desk. The phone rings. The caller sounds stressed but polite: they are a manager at a regional office, their phone was stolen over the weekend, they have a big meeting in an hour and they cannot get into anything. They know their employee ID, their manager’s name, the office they work in. Could you please reset their password and register their new phone for multi-factor authentication?

Most help desk staff want to help, and that is exactly what groups like Scattered Spider count on.

Who Is Scattered Spider?

Scattered Spider (also tracked under names such as UNC3944 and Octo Tempest) is a loose collective of mostly young, English-speaking cybercriminals. Unlike many ransomware crews, they are fluent in Western workplace culture, which makes their phone calls convincing. They have been linked to the 2023 attacks on MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment and, in 2025, to the attacks on Marks & Spencer and the Co-op in the UK, along with campaigns against insurers and airlines. Some members have worked with ransomware operations, including DragonForce, which was reportedly deployed at M&S.

How the Attack Usually Works

  1. Research. They gather names, roles and internal details from LinkedIn, data leaks and previous breaches.
  2. The call. They phone the help desk, sometimes the outsourced one, posing as an employee, often someone with privileged access.
  3. The reset. They persuade staff to reset a password and enrol a new MFA device, or to bypass MFA “just this once.”
  4. Rapid escalation. Once in, they move into single sign-on, cloud consoles, virtualisation platforms and identity systems, creating new accounts and disabling security tools.
  5. Theft and extortion. They steal data and, in some cases, deploy ransomware to encrypt systems.

Other tricks include SIM swapping, MFA “prompt bombing” and phishing pages that mimic company login portals.

Why It Works

How to Stop It

1. Strengthen identity verification

Stop relying on facts like employee ID, date of birth or manager’s name. Better options include video calls with ID checks, verification codes sent to a previously registered device, manager confirmation through a separate channel, or in-person verification for high-risk requests.

2. Treat privileged accounts differently

Password or MFA resets for administrators, executives and finance staff should require extra approval and a waiting period, never a quick phone fix.

3. Use phishing-resistant MFA

Passkeys and hardware security keys are much harder to abuse than SMS codes or push approvals. Pair them with strict rules for enrolling new devices.

4. Alert on risky changes

Generate security alerts when MFA methods change, new devices are registered, accounts log in from unusual locations shortly after a reset, or new admin accounts appear. Investigate quickly.

5. Limit outsourced help desk powers

Review what your IT service provider can do. Can they reset admin accounts? Bypass MFA? Make sure contracts and technical permissions reflect your risk appetite, and that providers follow your verification rules.

6. Train for the phone, not just email

Run realistic vishing simulations. Give help desk staff permission, and scripts, to slow down, say no and escalate without fear of blame.

7. Protect identity infrastructure

Harden single sign-on, identity providers and virtualisation consoles. Monitor them closely; once attackers control identity, they control everything.

8. Prepare to cut access fast

Have a plan to revoke sessions, disable compromised accounts and lock down administrative access quickly during an incident.

Advice for Smaller Organisations

You may not have a formal service desk, but the same trick works on whoever resets passwords, often an office manager or IT contractor. Agree a simple rule: no resets without calling the person back on a known number, and no MFA changes for anyone over the phone without a second person approving.

Give the help desk a way to verify callers

Scattered Spider shows that the most expensive attacks of recent years started with conversation, not code. Your help desk is part of your security perimeter. Give it strong verification tools, clear rules and the confidence to say “let me call you back,” and you close one of attackers’ favourite doors.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Scattered Spider a ransomware group?

It is better described as a social-engineering and intrusion group whose members have partnered with ransomware operations.

Would passkeys have stopped these attacks?

They help a lot, but if attackers persuade staff to enrol a new device for them, the weakness is the process. Strong verification is essential.

Have members been arrested?

Yes. Law enforcement in the US and UK has arrested and charged several alleged members since 2024, including arrests linked to the 2025 UK retail attacks.

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