🕑 Estimated reading time: 4 minutes | Last updated: May 18, 2026
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) uses algorithms designed to resist attacks by future quantum computers, which could break widely used public-key schemes such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. NIST published its first PQC standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key establishment and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) for signatures. Agencies such as NIST and the UK’s NCSC have set migration timelines running to around 2035. Organisations should inventory their cryptography now and prioritise long-lived sensitive data.

Almost everything secure online, from banking apps and WhatsApp chats to software updates and VPNs, relies on public-key cryptography such as RSA and elliptic-curve algorithms. These are safe against today’s computers. But a sufficiently powerful quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could break them. Nobody knows exactly when such a machine will exist, and estimates vary widely. So why are security agencies urging action now?
Table of Contents
The “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” Problem
An attacker does not need a quantum computer today to cause damage tomorrow. They can record encrypted traffic or steal encrypted data now, store it, and decrypt it once quantum capability arrives. Anything that must stay confidential for many years, such as health records, state secrets, intellectual property, legal files and long-term financial data, is already at risk.
Digital signatures face a different but related risk: once quantum computers can forge signatures, attackers could impersonate software publishers or tamper with documents. Systems with long lifetimes, like cars, satellites, industrial controls and smart meters, need quantum-safe designs well before that day.
What Is Post-Quantum Cryptography?
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) means new public-key algorithms based on mathematical problems believed to be hard for both classical and quantum computers. Importantly, PQC runs on ordinary computers; you do not need quantum hardware to use it. Symmetric encryption, such as AES with 256-bit keys, and modern hash functions are considered far less affected and remain in use.
The New Standards
After an eight-year international competition, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published its first PQC standards in August 2024:
- FIPS 203 – ML-KEM (derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber): for establishing shared keys, the job RSA and Diffie-Hellman do in protocols like TLS.
- FIPS 204 – ML-DSA (derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium): the main digital signature standard.
- FIPS 205 – SLH-DSA (derived from SPHINCS+): a hash-based signature scheme as a backup with different security assumptions.
In March 2025, NIST selected HQC as an additional key-establishment algorithm, providing a backup based on different mathematics, and further signature standards are in development.
Migration Timelines
Governments have started setting expectations. NIST has proposed deprecating today’s quantum-vulnerable algorithms by 2030 and disallowing them by 2035 for US federal use. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has set out a roadmap in which organisations complete discovery and planning by 2028, migrate their highest-priority systems by 2031 and complete migration by 2035. These dates may sound distant, but large organisations’ cryptographic migrations historically take a decade or more.
It Is Already Happening
You may already be using PQC without knowing it. Major browsers and content delivery networks have enabled hybrid key exchange that combines classical and post-quantum algorithms, and Apple and Signal have added post-quantum protection to their messaging protocols. Hybrid approaches mean that even if the new algorithm turned out to have a weakness, security would be no worse than today’s.
A Practical Roadmap for Organisations
- Appoint an owner for quantum readiness and brief leadership.
- Build a cryptographic inventory: where do you use public-key cryptography, in TLS, VPNs, code signing, PKI, databases, IoT devices and third-party products?
- Prioritise by data lifetime and system lifetime. Protect long-lived sensitive data and long-lived devices first.
- Ask vendors about their PQC plans and include quantum readiness in procurement requirements.
- Design for crypto agility: make it possible to swap algorithms without rebuilding systems.
- Start with hybrid deployments where supported, such as TLS libraries and VPN products offering ML-KEM.
- Test performance: PQC keys and signatures are larger, which can affect constrained devices and network protocols.
What About Bitcoin and Blockchains?
Blockchains rely heavily on elliptic-curve signatures. A capable quantum computer could, in theory, derive private keys from exposed public keys, putting coins in certain addresses at risk. Developer communities for major blockchains are discussing quantum-resistant signature schemes and migration paths. For now, avoiding address reuse and following wallet best practices reduces exposure.
Does a Small Business Need to Worry?
Most small businesses will get PQC through updates to browsers, operating systems, cloud services and VPN products. Your job is to keep software updated, choose vendors with clear roadmaps and avoid locking yourself into outdated systems that cannot be upgraded.
Start with data that must stay secret for years
Quantum computers capable of breaking today’s encryption are not here yet, but the data they could expose is being collected today. With standards published and timelines set, post-quantum migration has moved from research topic to planning task. The organisations that start their inventory now will have an orderly transition rather than a scramble.
Frequently Asked Questions
Will quantum computers break all encryption?
No. They threaten current public-key algorithms most; strong symmetric encryption like AES-256 remains robust.
When will quantum computers break RSA?
Nobody knows. Estimates range widely, which is why agencies recommend starting migration now.
Do I need special hardware for PQC?
No. Post-quantum algorithms run on ordinary computers and devices.