🕑 Estimated reading time: 4 minutes  |  Last updated: December 17, 2024

Cross-chain bridges let users move assets between blockchains, usually by locking tokens on one chain and issuing equivalents on another. Because they hold large pools of locked funds and depend on complex code or small validator groups, they are prime targets. Major examples include Ronin (about $625 million, March 2022, via compromised validator keys), Wormhole (about $325 million, February 2022, via a signature verification bug) and Nomad (about $190 million, August 2022, via a faulty upgrade). Chainalysis estimated bridges accounted for around two-thirds of crypto stolen in 2022.

Lightened bridge at night

Moving crypto from one blockchain to another feels as simple as a bank transfer. Behind the scenes, it relies on bridges that hold huge pools of funds, and some of the largest thefts in crypto history have come from breaking them.

The crypto world is made up of many separate blockchains, each with its own tokens and applications. Cross-chain bridges connect them, letting users move value from, say, Ethereum to another network. They are essential infrastructure for decentralised finance (DeFi), but they have also become the most lucrative targets for hackers. In 2022 alone, blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis estimated that around $2 billion was stolen from bridges, roughly two-thirds of all crypto stolen that year.

How Bridges Work

Most bridges use a “lock and mint” model. You deposit tokens into a bridge contract on the source chain, where they are locked. The bridge then verifies the deposit and mints a wrapped version of the token on the destination chain. To move back, the wrapped tokens are burned and the originals unlocked.

The critical question is who or what verifies that a deposit really happened. Approaches include:

Why Bridges Are So Attractive to Attackers

The Biggest Bridge Hacks

Ronin (March 2022, about $625 million)

The Ronin bridge, which supported the popular game Axie Infinity, required five of nine validator signatures to approve withdrawals. Attackers gained control of five keys, four belonging to the game’s developer Sky Mavis and one from a partner whose temporary permission had never been revoked. Reports indicated the intrusion began with a fake job offer sent to an employee. The theft went unnoticed for about six days. The FBI attributed the attack to North Korea’s Lazarus Group.

Lessons: too few keys, concentrated in one organisation, plus forgotten permissions and slow monitoring.

Wormhole (February 2022, about $325 million)

An attacker exploited a flaw in how Wormhole’s Solana contract verified signatures, allowing them to mint 120,000 wrapped ether without depositing real collateral. Jump Crypto, a backer of the project, replaced the stolen funds to restore the bridge’s backing.

Lessons: verification logic is the heart of a bridge and must be rigorously reviewed and tested, including the use of deprecated functions.

Nomad (August 2022, about $190 million)

A routine upgrade introduced an initialisation error that caused the bridge to treat invalid messages as proven. Once the first attacker demonstrated the exploit, hundreds of others copied the transaction, simply replacing the address with their own, in a chaotic free-for-all. Some participants later returned funds as “white hats.”

Lessons: upgrades are high-risk changes that need the same scrutiny as new code, and a single misconfiguration can be catastrophic.

Harmony Horizon (June 2022, about $100 million)

The bridge was secured by a two-of-five multi-signature wallet. Compromising just two keys was enough to drain it.

Beyond Bridges: Centralised Platforms in 2024

Large thefts continued in 2024 through compromised signing infrastructure at centralised platforms. In May, Japanese exchange DMM Bitcoin lost bitcoin worth around $300 million, and in July, Indian exchange WazirX lost about $230 million after one of its multi-signature wallets was compromised. These incidents show that multi-signature setups are only as strong as the devices, software and people involved in signing.

How Bridge and DeFi Projects Can Reduce Risk

  1. Decentralise verification with larger, independent validator sets or proof-based designs.
  2. Protect keys with hardware security modules, threshold signatures and strict operational security.
  3. Revoke unused permissions immediately and review access regularly.
  4. Audit every change, including upgrades and configuration, not just initial deployments.
  5. Add circuit breakers: rate limits, withdrawal caps and delays for very large transfers.
  6. Monitor continuously with automated alerts for abnormal flows.
  7. Run substantial bug bounties to reward disclosure instead of exploitation.
  8. Train staff against social engineering, particularly fake recruitment approaches.

What Users Can Do

What bridge failures reveal about concentrated risk

Bridges solve a real problem, but they concentrate risk in ways that attackers have repeatedly exploited. The common threads, small sets of keys, untested upgrades, flawed verification and slow detection, are well understood. Projects that design for decentralisation, defence in depth and rapid response can make these critical connectors far safer.

Frequently Asked Questions

Are cross-chain bridges safe to use?

They carry extra risk compared with holding assets on their native chain. Use reputable, audited bridges and limit exposure.

Who is behind most large crypto hacks?

Many of the largest have been attributed by governments and analysts to North Korea-linked groups, though other criminals are also active.

What is a multi-signature wallet?

A wallet that requires several independent keys to approve a transaction, reducing reliance on any single key.

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