🕑 Estimated reading time: 4 minutes | Last updated: March 25, 2025
On 21 February 2025, attackers stole roughly 400,000 ETH, worth about $1.5 billion, from crypto exchange Bybit’s Ethereum multi-signature cold wallet. Investigations indicated that the attackers compromised a developer machine at Safe{Wallet}, the multisig interface Bybit used, and injected malicious code so that signers saw a routine transfer while actually approving a change that handed control of the wallet to the attackers. The FBI attributed the theft to North Korea. Key lessons: avoid blind signing, verify transactions independently, harden signing environments and treat wallet software as part of the supply chain.

For years, a multi-signature cold wallet was treated as the safest place to keep crypto. In February 2025 that assumption was put to the hardest possible test, and the result shook the whole industry.
Multi-signature cold wallets are often presented as the gold standard for protecting large crypto holdings. Funds are kept offline, and moving them requires approval from several independent key holders. On 21 February 2025, that model was put to the test in spectacular fashion when Dubai-based exchange Bybit lost roughly 400,000 ETH, worth about $1.5 billion, from one of its Ethereum cold wallets. It was the largest crypto theft on record, eclipsing even the 2022 Ronin bridge hack.
The attack did not break Ethereum’s cryptography or guess anyone’s keys. Instead, it manipulated what the legitimate signers saw on their screens.
Table of Contents
What Happened
Bybit stored a large amount of ether in a multi-signature wallet built on Safe (formerly Gnosis Safe), a widely used smart contract wallet. During what appeared to be a routine transfer from the cold wallet to a warm wallet, Bybit’s signers approved a transaction through the Safe{Wallet} web interface. The interface displayed the expected destination and details. But the transaction they actually signed modified the wallet’s smart contract logic, effectively handing control of the wallet to the attackers, who then drained it.
How the Attackers Did It
Forensic investigations published by Bybit’s investigators and Safe indicated that attackers had compromised the computer of a Safe{Wallet} developer. Using that access, they injected malicious JavaScript into the Safe{Wallet} web application’s front-end files hosted in the cloud. The code was targeted: it activated only for Bybit’s wallet, altering the transaction behind the scenes while showing signers a normal-looking request. After the theft, the malicious code was removed.
Because the hardware wallets used for signing did not display the full, human-readable meaning of the complex transaction, signers were effectively blind signing, approving data they could not independently interpret.
Who Was Behind It?
Within days, the FBI publicly attributed the theft to North Korea, identifying the activity as part of the cluster it tracks as “TraderTraitor,” associated with the Lazarus Group. The attackers moved quickly to convert and launder the stolen ether through numerous addresses, decentralised exchanges and cross-chain services. Bybit launched a bounty programme offering rewards for helping to freeze funds, and some assets were frozen by exchanges and token issuers.
Bybit’s Response
Bybit’s chief executive announced the incident publicly within hours and stated that customer assets were backed and that the exchange would cover the loss. The exchange processed a wave of withdrawals, secured bridge loans and purchased ether to restore its reserves within days. The rapid, transparent response helped prevent a wider crisis of confidence, but the episode raised hard questions about the security of institutional crypto custody.
Seven Lessons for Exchanges and Institutions
1. Multisig protects against single points of failure, not shared ones
Requiring several signatures is powerful, but if all signers rely on the same compromised interface, the attacker only needs to fool that one interface.
2. Eliminate blind signing
Signers must be able to verify exactly what a transaction does. Use hardware wallets and tools that support clear signing for the transaction types you use, and decode transactions independently before approval.
3. Verify on an independent path
Check transaction data, especially the destination, the operation type and any contract calls, using a separate, trusted tool or device that does not depend on the same web front end. Simulate transactions before signing.
4. Treat wallet software as part of your supply chain
The compromise originated at a third-party provider. Assess the security of wallet and custody vendors, consider self-hosting audited interfaces, and pin and verify front-end code.
5. Harden signing environments
Use dedicated, locked-down devices for signing, separate from everyday browsing and email, and protect developers and administrators against social engineering, a recurring entry point for North Korean groups.
6. Add time delays and limits
Policies such as timelocks for wallet configuration changes, withdrawal limits and additional approval for unusual operations give defenders time to detect and stop malicious transactions.
7. Monitor and prepare
Real-time monitoring of wallet contract changes and large outflows, plus pre-established relationships with blockchain analytics firms, exchanges and stablecoin issuers, can help freeze funds quickly.
What It Means for Ordinary Investors
- Exchange risk is real. Even large, well-funded platforms can be hacked. Keep only what you need for trading on exchanges.
- Self-custody carries similar lessons. Read what your hardware wallet shows you, be cautious with complex contract interactions and never approve transactions you do not understand.
- Watch for scams after major hacks. Fraudsters often impersonate affected exchanges, offering fake “compensation” or “recovery.”
- Look at proof of reserves and transparency when choosing a platform.
Verify what the wallet is actually signing
The Bybit hack showed that the weakest link in crypto security may not be the blockchain, the keys or even the signers, but the software that sits between people and the transactions they approve. Strong custody requires defence in depth: independent verification, hardened environments, careful vendor management and the ability to respond in minutes.
Frequently Asked Questions
How much was stolen in the Bybit hack?
Around 400,000 ETH and related tokens, worth approximately $1.5 billion at the time.
Did Bybit customers lose their money?
Bybit said it would cover the loss and restored its reserves within days, so customer balances were maintained.
What is blind signing?
Approving a transaction without being able to see or understand its full details, for example when a hardware wallet shows only raw data.